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Article 6

JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION REVISITED

DanielJ Meltzer*
INTRODUCTION

Ben Kaplan, an astute man with the highest of standards, once
told me that "pound for pound," David Shapiro was the most valuable
member of the Harvard Law School faculty. Ben had a good basis of
knowledge, having been a colleague, a fellow civil procedure teacher,
and a co-reporter with David on the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Judgments. A skeptic might observe that David's
slim figure helps him on the evaluative scale that Ben chose, but I am
confident that Ben's judgment would not have changed even had
David been on steroids.
The phrase "luminous intelligence," though it has the ring of a
cliche, aptly characterizes David's mind. He is a superb analyst, but
unlike some, David's analyses are always clear, succinct, and precise.
David illuminates every issue about which he writes or speaks: he gets
to the heart of a matter without oversimplifying, and he explores (or
discovers) the complexities of a problem without generating confusion or uncertainty. David once wrote that "an author's ability to
make compelling statements of contrasting views is, for me, a powerful
signal of the author's worth as a scholar,"' and no one is better able to
see all sides of a question than David. David's work has ranged
broadly-teaching and writing about administrative law, labor law, the
legal profession, constitutional federalism, and even critical legal studies. 2 But his primary interest, and the focus of his writing, concerns
civil procedure and federal jurisdiction, topics about which he seems
to know everything.
*

Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am very grateful to Won Shin

for superb research assistance.
1 David L. Shapiro, Foreword:A Cave Drawingfor the Ages, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1834,
1834 (1999) (introducing a symposium celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Lon L.
Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949)).
2 See his brilliant essay, David L. Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36
STAN. L. REv. 465 (1984).
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My own association with David has been anchored in our joint
work on a federal courts casebook.3 But even before I joined him on
that project, I had learned, early in my teaching career, the important
lesson that I should never publish anything without getting David's
comments. He is a marvelous and generous editor, a superb stylist,
and an acute critic. He also possesses what seems to me to be a wasting asset in academia, a brilliant sense of humor, which one finds in
his writings 4 and also in various ephemera (marginal comments on
drafts, e-mail correspondence, etc.).
For all these reasons, and more, I am delighted that the Notre
Dame Law Review has seen fit to commemorate his distinguished
achievements, and I am honored to have been asked to participate.
I.

SHAPIRO'S JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION

In this Article, I want to explore a set of themes underlying Shapiro's work, themes most clearly set forth in his pathbreaking article,
Jurisdiction and Discretion.5 That article, recently cited as one of the
most influential articles published in the New York University Law Review, 6 took as its topic various assertions by judges and commentators
"that the federal courts are obligated to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution and by Congress. '7 Proponents of
that view spanned the centuries and included none less than Chief
Justice John Marshall8 and Justice William Brennan. 9
Shapiro's broad-ranging survey of jurisdictional doctrines and
their origins showed how sharply such statements depart from central
features of the legal landscape. The article, when published, seemed
to me to be an almost unanswerable response to those positing an
obligation of the federal courts to exercise all jurisdiction that ap3

The current edition is RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIELJ. MELTZER

&

DAVID L.

& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed.
2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. Earlier editions of that casebook on which I
collaborated with David were published in 1988 (3d ed.) and 1996 (4th ed.).
4 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 2.
5 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985).
6 Barry Friedman, Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective: Most Influential ArticlesDavid L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553-54 (2000).
7 Shapiro, supra note 5, at 543.
8 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more
right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.").
9 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15
(1983) ("[T]he federal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation . .. to exercise
the jurisdiction given them."' (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))).
SHAPIRO, HART
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peared to fall within the scope of a textual grant from Congress. More
broadly, Shapiro's Jurisdictionand Discretion was an important counter
to a conception of the separation of powers in which Congress has
exclusive policymaking authority, not only at the wholesale but also at
the retail level, in determining whether federal jurisdiction may be
exercised. Part of the power of Shapiro's response, as Barry Friedman
has noted,' 0 lies simply in its comprehensive and sophisticated demonstration that judicial decisionmaking that rounds out the edges of
jurisdictional enactments is deeply entrenched, both as a matter of
historical experience and of contemporary practice. "Is" may not be
"ought,"'" but claims that judicial practices are politically illegitimate
are far more difficult to sustain when those practices are widespread
and longstanding and when there is a pattern not of congressional
12
opposition but, instead, of apparent congressional acquiescence.
10 See Friedman, supra note 6,at 1553-54.
11 This theme has been developed by Professor Redish. See Martin H. Redish,
JudicialParity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on FederalJurisdiction
and ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329, 349-51 (1988).
12 See Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 137-44 (1984); cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the lawfulness of
presidential action often depends on whether Congress has granted, been silent
about, or purported to restrict presidential authority).
The claim of congressional acquiescence is not uncontroversial. Indeed, a narrower, objection to Shapiro's view than the one noted in the text is that the limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction that Congress has enacted should be
taken as effectively occupying the field and thus precluding the development by the
federal courts of additional limitations. See Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An
Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction and Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative
Action, 1990 BYU L. REV. 321, 337-38.
The difficulty with that objection, it seems to me, is its premise that Congress
intended to occupy the field. For example, while the Anti-Injunction Act, now 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (2000), was first enacted in 1793, its existence was never viewed by the
courts as precluding their development of doctrines of limitation, which they formulated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The subsequent enactment
in the 1930s of additional statutory limitations-the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28
U.S.C. § 1341, and the Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 1342-occurred against a
background ofjudge-made limitations, but there is nothing in their text or legislative
history to suggest that they were meant to sweep those limitations aside rather than,
instead, supplementing them. One other doctrine sometimes mentioned as an example of a statutory limitation on jurisdiction, the exhaustion requirement in habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), see Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and
the Limits of theJudicialFunction,94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 n.18, 81 (1984), is in fact a codification and elaboration by Congress (first in 1948, with subsequent amendments) of a
judge-made doctrine, seeExparteRoyall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886); here, too, congressional action does not appear to question the legitimacy of the initial judicial action.
Another example of codification, also one that reflects no apparent congressional
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Moreover, Shapiro's argument did not merely establish the depth and
breadth of the tradition of judicial discretion, but also defended it as
normatively justified.
Because citation counts are in vogue in some quarters, it may not
be amiss to mention that Shapiro's article has been cited in six Supreme Court decisions' 3 and 164 law review articles. 14 Indeed, Juris-

diction and Discretion has become so much a part of the current
understanding that it is cited even in opinions with which Shapiro
himself would disagree' 5 and by a jurist like Justice Scalia, who, as we
shall see, does not find its themes entirely congenial. 16
Still, for several reasons, I think there is profit in exploring further the themes sounded in Shapiro's article. First, while much of the
Supreme Court's work product resonates with Shapiro's argument,
the Court has also, as I just suggested, rendered some decisions that
are difficult to square with its premises. 17 Second, while the article is
typically cited approvingly in the secondary literature,1 8 it also is fredisapproval ofjudicial discretion, is the partial statutory codification of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
13 Shapiro's article has been cited in five majority opinions. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 717 (1996); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-87 (1995); New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989); Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986). It also has been cited
in one concurring opinion, Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring),
and two dissenting opinions, Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 474 n.* (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting), and Merrell Dow,478 U.S. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14 Search of WESTLAW,Journals and Law Reviews Database (JLR) Uan. 7, 2004)
(search for law reviews citing Shapiro, supra note 5).
15 Compare Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731 (holding that a federal court may dismiss
or remand an action on abstention grounds only if it seeks equitable or otherwise
discretionary relief), with Shapiro, supra note 5, at 571 ("[L]aw and equity have long
ceased to be separate systems, in both England and the United States, and thus arguments that discretion should be limited as if they were still separate seem a bit
strained."); compare Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 474 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging abstention in a dispute between two states falling within the Supreme Court's exclusive original jurisdiction), with Shapiro, supra note 5, at 561 (deeming criticism of the Court's
refusal to exercise such jurisdiction "unanswerable").
16 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 359.
17 See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721, 731; Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 474 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
18 The citations are voluminous. For a few examples by notable scholars, see 17A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241, at 3 n.1 (2d
ed. 1988); Stephen B. Burbank, JurisdictionalEquilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in NationalLaw, 49 AM.J. COMP. L. 203, 215 n.61 (2001); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of
Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21 n.87 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
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quently taken merely as advancing one side of a debate and paired
with cites to commentary (usually that of Professor Martin Redish' 9 )
taking the diametrically opposite view.2 0 Shapiro, thus, has not quite
convinced all comers. 2 1 Finally, and most fundamentally, the broad
question that Shapiro raises about the proper allocation of decisional
authority between judges and the legislature is a profound one, which
reaches beyond questions of federal court jurisdiction about which I
think there is room for additional observations. I would like to examine and elaborate on some of his key arguments, especially those
that seek not merely to describe but also to justify judicial discretion.

Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 126 n.346
(1988); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and ProceduralDefault in FederalHabeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679, 709 n.98 (1990); Henry Paul
Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 987 n.64 (1986);James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
OriginalJurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555, 566 n.36 (1994); Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, JudicialFederalism and the Administrative States, 87
CAL. L. REV. 613, 654 n.165 (1999).
For my own reliance on it, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1798 n.358
(1991); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring ConstitutionalViolations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as PrivateAttorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 320 n.420
(1988); DanielJ. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article II, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569,

1626 n.216 (1990) [hereinafter Meltzer, History and Structure];Daniel J. Meltzer, The
Supreme Court'sJudicialPassivity, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 343, 396 n.215 [hereinafter Melt-

zer, Judicial Passivity].
19 See MARTIN H. REDISH,

THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL

JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY

(1991); Redish, supra note 11.

20 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486 n.ll (1987); George D. Brown, When Federalism
and Separation of Powers Collide-RethinkingYounger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
114, 142-43 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 345-46, 346 n.213 (1993);
Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and FederalJurisdiction,

85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1990); Jackson, supra note 18, at 102 nn.405 & 407;
Monaghan, supra note 18, at 987 n.64; James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdictionand
Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 154-55

(1999); Redish, supra note 11, at 349-51; Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics-A Half Measure of Authority for JurisdictionalCommon Law, 1991 BYU L. REv. 767,

767; Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in
the Law of FederalCourts, 71 B.U. L. REv. 609, 610 n.5 (1991); Woolhandler & Collins,
supra note 18, at 654; Note, Mr. Smith Goes to FederalCourt: FederalQuestionJurisdiction

Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2272, 2276 & nn.25-26
(2002).
21 See, e.g., Lee & Wilkins, supra note 12, at 337-38; Shreve, supra note 20, at 767.
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JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION IN THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ACADEMY

A.

The Supreme Court's Treatment ofJurisdiction and Discretion

Let me begin by tracing the influence of Jurisdictionand Discretion
in the Supreme Court. Several of the Court's citations are relatively
routine. In one instance, the Court cited Shapiro's article for the proposition that "[w]hen anticipatory relief is sought in federal court
against a state statute, respect for the place of the States in our federal
system calls for close consideration of that core question. '22 In a second case, Wyoming v. Oklahoma,2 3 both the majority and dissenting
opinions followed the peculiar tradition of treating Congress's grant
of original Supreme Court jurisdiction in suits between two states as
discretionary, 2 4 despite the fact that the congressional statute granting 25 jurisdiction over such cases makes that grant exclusive. 26 Justice
Thomas's dissent, however, at least acknowledged Shapiro's telling
criticism of that tradition 27-a criticism rooted in the critical idea that
judicial discretion has limits and that judicial decisionmaking must be
faithful to the basic prescriptions established by Congress. 28 For the
Supreme Court to decline to exercise original jurisdiction that Congress has made exclusive, particularly when alternative fora (even a
federal district court located in a particular state) might be thought to
lack both the disinterest and the dignity required to resolve a dispute
between two states, 29 is, as Shapiro noted, particularly difficult to
justify.
Several other Supreme Court decisions have cited Shapiro's article in support of conclusions of which I suspect he would not approve.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Wilton v. Seven Falls
Co. 30 cites Jurisdiction and Discretion in connection with an argument
that the text of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which states that the
federal courts "may" exercise jurisdiction, 3 1 confers "on federal courts
unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the
22

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997).

23 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
24 See id. at 450-51; id. at 474-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25 "Granting" is not an entirely accurate verb, as, strictly speaking, Article III of
the Constitution constitutes a self-executing grant of original jurisdiction.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1251(1) (2000).
27 See Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 475 n.* (Thomas, J., dissenting).
28 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 575-77.
29 See, e.g., Meltzer, History and Structure, supra note 18, at 1598-608.
30 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
31
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
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rights of litigants. '3 2 That characterization of the discretion available
in declaratory actions as substantial is surely correct, but the Court's
statement that the discretion is unique could be taken to imply that
jurisdictional grants lacking expressly discretionary language should
be construed as permitting little if any authority to decline to exercise
jurisdiction-an implication with which Shapiro would not agree.
The seeds for such an implication had been planted some years
earlier by Justice Scalia in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of
New Orleans,3 3 a case in which, interestingly enough, then Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro represented the United States and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission as amici curiae. 34 In reversing the
courts below, which had abstained from the exercise of jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court disposed of the case as the Brief for the United
States proposed. The majority's rationale for rejecting abstention,
however, differed somewhat from the rationale that Deputy Solicitor
General Shapiro advanced. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia, after
reciting what he termed "the undisputed constitutional principle that
Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds," acknowledged
that "[t] hat principle does not eliminate, however, and the categorical
assertions based upon it do not call into question, the federal courts'
discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief-a
discretion that was part of the common-law background against which
the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted. See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion .... -35 Though citing Shapiro's article, Justice
Scalia subtly re-shaped its argument by suggesting that the courts'
traditional discretion was limited to declining to "grant certain kinds
of relief' (for example, injunctive and declaratory relief, the forms of
relief sought in the New OrleansPublic Service case), and that the courts
could not decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether. 36 Shapiro's arti32 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 287 (emphasis added).
33 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
34 See Brief for the United States and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
as Amici Curiae, New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989) (No. 88-348).
35 New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 359.
36 Justice Scalia has in other settings sought to preserve a pre-merger distinction
between law and equity in a fashion that has drawn vigorous criticism.

See, e.g., Ste-

phen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History and Limitations on Federal
JudicialPower-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1308-09 (2000); John H.
Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable":The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell,
Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1321-65 (2003); Judith Resnik,

ConstrictingRemedies: The RehnquistJudiciary,Congress and FederalPower, 78
231-56 (2003).

IND.

L.J. 223,
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cle, by contrast, established that the common law background of discretion, to which Justice Scalia did allude,3 7 was far broader.38
The seed planted in the New OrleansPublic Service opinion finally
sprouted into a significant restriction on the notion of judicial discretion in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.39 The case was a common
law action for breach of contract, and it was removed from state to
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The plaintiff
moved to remand the action to state court, arguing that so-called Burford abstention was appropriate. 40 The district court agreed and ordered the case remanded. 41 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the remand on abstention grounds was in error, and the Su42
preme Court unanimously agreed with that conclusion.
Although Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court cited Jurisdiction and Discretion,4 3 and quoted the language from New Orleans Public
Service acknowledging that the Court's application of abstention doctrines reflected "the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted,"44 the opinion proceeded
to declare that "federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand
cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being
sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary." 45 In Quackenbush, the
relief sought was simply damages at law for contractual breach, a form
of relief that was not discretionary, and hence, the Court ruled, a federal court could not remand the case to state court on abstention
grounds.
Justice O'Connor's crabbed characterization of the scope ofjudicial discretion required her to engage in some analytical wriggling to
37 New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 359 (citing Shapiro, supra note 5).
38 See Brown, supra note 20, at 150.
39 517 U.S. 706 (1996). The description that follows draws on HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 3, at 1192-211.
40 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1203-13 (discussing Burford abstention). In Quackenbush, the
plaintiff was California's Insurance Commissioner, who had been appointed trustee of
an insurance company ordered into liquidation by a California court. Quackenbush,
517 U.S. at 709. The commissioner argued that federal adjudication might interfere
with California's resolution of the underlying insolvency and that the viability of the
insurer's set-off claims depended on a disputed question of state law pending before
the California courts in another case arising out of the same insolvency. Id.
41 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 709-10.
42 Shapiro was of counsel to the plaintiff's unsuccessful effort to have the decision
below reversed. See Brief for the Petitioner, Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 571 U.S.
706 (1996) (No. 95-244).
43 Quakenbush, 517 U.S. at 715 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 359).
44 Id. at 717.
45 Id. at 731.
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explain a number of precedents. She acknowledged that several prior
Supreme Court decisions had in fact upheld abstention in damages
actions at law, 4 6 but distinguished those precedents either as not having addressed the issue fully or as having merely stayed or postponed a
federal action rather than remanding it to state court or dismissing it
outright. 47 She also acknowledged that "federal courts have discretion to dismiss damages actions.., under the common-law doctrine of
forum non conveniens," but contended that the abstention doctrine was
"of a distinct historical pedigree" and that it more narrowly circumscribed judicial discretion to dismiss or remand a case than did the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 48 Thus, the Court concluded that
although a doctrine like Burford abstention "might support a federal
49 it
court's decision to postpone adjudication of a damages action,
could not support outright dismissal of an action filed in federal court
or, as in the case before it, remand of a removed case to state court.
The difficulties with the various components of this reasoning
have been pointed out, 50 and they suggest that the Court's reformula-

tion of Shapiro's approach has little to commend it. Consider first the
Court's distinction between the dismissal or remand of a federal action, which the Court prohibits, and the stay of the action, which the
Court suggests might be justified. In a case like Quackenbush, the practical effect of a stay may be not merely to postpone, but to permanently prevent, federal court litigation. For even if the plaintiff refiled a state court action, the defendant could remove that action too
and presumably have it stayed as well. Even where a stay might permit
a litigant to re-file successfully in state court without facing the prospect of removal-as might be true where the only basis for federal
jurisdiction is diversity and the suit is against an in-state defendant 5 146 Id. at 719-20 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co.,
400 U.S. 41, 44 (1970) (per curiam); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co.,
369 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1962) (per curiam); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207,
212 (1960); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-30 (1959)).
47 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 720-23. The Court distinguished FairAssessment in
Real EstateAss'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), which held that a federal court should
not entertain a § 1983 action for damages arising from a state tax scheme, on the
ground that it had been construed by the subsequent decision in National Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1995), as "a case

about the scope of the § 1983 cause of action, not the abstention doctrines." Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 719 (citation omitted).
48 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721-22.
49 Id. at 730.
50 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1192-94.
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
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the stay's effect is likely to be no different in the end than that of a
dismissal. As Richard Fallon, David Shapiro, and I have pointed out
(albeit in the interrogative form), "[i]f the federal action is stayed
pending resolution of the state action, won't the state court's determination be dispositive of the federal action under doctrines of claim
and issue preclusion? If so, isn't the practical effect of a stay identical
52
to that of an order dismissing the federal action?"
Indeed, that functional similarity between a dismissal or remand
on the one hand, and a stay on the other, was recognized by the Supreme Court in its decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospitalv. Mercury Construction Corp.53 as the basis for finding that an order staying a
54
federal action, like an order dismissing such an action, is appealable.
In Quackenbush, the Court relied on that aspect of the Moses H. Cone
decision in order to uphold the existence of appellate jurisdiction to
review the district court's decision to remand the action on abstention
grounds, 55 but then, in discussing the merits of the remand, the majority simply breezed by the persuasive demonstration in Moses H. Cone
that an abstention-based stay did not differ in substance from an ab56
stention-based dismissal.
The other distinction drawn by the Court in Quackenbush-between dismissals based on forum non conveniens, where judicial discretion is broader, and dismissals based on abstention, whose "distinct
historical pedigree" justifies only a narrow ambit of judicial discretion 5 7-is also not robust. Again, to quote skepticism voiced by Fallon, Shapiro, and me, isn't the Court's distinction little "more than an
ipse dixit"?58 Is there any reason of principle why "the considerations
of convenience and judicial administration that underlie forum non
conveniens doctrine [should] be treated as more important than the
considerations of comity and federalism that support abstention
59
doctrines?"
Finally, the Court's attempt sharply to distinguish equitable (and
other "discretionary") remedies from legal remedies is difficult to sustain in a world in which law and equity have long been fused. (Imagine a case in which a plaintiff sought both forms of relief, as, for
example, if a plaintiff sued in the alternative for specific performance
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

supra note 3, at 1193.
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
Id. at 8-10.
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-15 (1996).
Id. at 716-31.
Id. at 722-23.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1194.
Id.
HART & WECHSLER,
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of a contract and for damages for breach; would abstention be appropriate as to the former type of relief but not the latter?) Quackenbush
is not the only instance in which the Court, in recent years, has based
important decisions on efforts to maintain a sharp and increasingly
nonfunctional distinction between law and equity, and commentators
(myself included) have generally not been kind to these efforts. 60
Clearly Shapiro's article has been a starting point of reference for
a number of important Supreme Court decisions. Unfortunately, as
often happens to commentators, Shapiro's wisdom has sometimes
fallen on deaf ears.
B.

The Academy

Little point would be served in trying to discuss all of the references to Jurisdiction and Discretion in the secondary literature. Let me
instead try to focus on a particularly interesting commentary that
takes issue with aspects of Shapiro's analysis, for that commentary relates to the preceding discussion of the Quackenbush decision and it
highlights an important feature of the underlying problem that Shapiro addresses.
Writing six years after the publication of Jurisdictionand Discretion,
Professor Shreve advocated a broader judicial role, in rounding out
jurisdictional statutes, than that deemed appropriate by Chief Justice
Marshall orJustice Brennan. 61 But Shreve's argument is far more limited than Shapiro's, as Shreve contends that courts should not decline
to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of what he calls "political" policies.
He argues that "policies of judicial administration accounted scarcely
if at all for the language in article III, section 1, reposing in Congress
special authority over the federal judicial power," and that therefore
60 See sources cited supra note 36.
61 See Shreve, supra note 20. Shreve preferred to deem the judicial role that he
favored a kind of jurisdictional common law rather than a question of the proper
judicial role in interpreting the jurisdictional statutes. The line between statutory interpretation and judicial lawmaking is an indistinct one. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 3, at 685. However, in one respect Shreve's description seems to beg the question. He says he means "by jurisdictional common law doctrine federal courts use

either to explain why they adjudicate claims for which Congress has not conferred
jurisdiction or to explain why they refuse to adjudicate claims that Congress has constitutionally authorized them to hear." Shreve, supra note 20, at 772. But proponents
of a broad judicial role would take issue with the proposition that judicial decisions
fleshing outjurisdictional statutes at the margin are in tension with what Congress has
or has not authorized, and would contend, instead, that they are the best understanding of exactly what Congress, in light of a broad set of background understandings,
should be taken to have authorized. Professor Shreve later acknowledges as much.
See id. at 782.
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"[s] eparation of powers concerns.., are ... less likely to be aroused"
by decisions based on concerns about judicial administration than by
decisions based on the courts' pursuit of "political ends." 62
Shreve's conclusion, however, does not follow from his premise.
One could just as easily argue that the presence of "political" ends in
Article III suggests that those are just the kinds of factors relevant to
interpretation of jurisdictional grants under Article III. Indeed, Justice Brennan has come close to suggesting as much. 63
Moreover, the distinction between political and administrative
considerations is an extraordinarily difficult one to draw. 64 For example, Younger abstention 65 is viewed by Shreve as political, though it can
be justified, at least in some settings, in part because it reduces the risk
of duplicative proceedings 6 6-a policy concern that Shreve endorses
as administrative. 67 Similarly, the desire to have state courts provide
the authoritative determination of unsettled state law could easily be
viewed as one of judicial administration, yet its instantiation in the
Pullman doctrine 68 is often viewed as "political," both because it
emerges from a respect for state control over state law and because it
can seriously delay federal adjudication. 69 By contrast, forum non
62 Shreve, supra note 20, at 788-89 (footnotes omitted).
63 In Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsInc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), Justice
Brennan, in dissent, objected to basing jurisdictional decisions on concerns about the
volume of litigation. Quoting ChiefJustice Marshall's statement in Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), that the Court has "no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given," Justice
Brennan stated that
[t]he narrow exceptions we have recognized to Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum have all been justified by compelling judicial concerns of comity and federalism. . . .It would be wholly illegitimate, however, for this
Court to determine that there was no jurisdiction over a class of cases simply
because the Court thought that there were too many cases in the federal
courts.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 829 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
64 This point echoes the recognition that claims of expertise by administrative
agencies are an incomplete justification for lawmaking by agencies and that agency
policymaking necessarily involves value-based or political choices. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88

HARV.L. REV. 1669 (1975).
65 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
66 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1239.
67 See Shreve, supra note 20, at 797-98.
68 See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
69 Shreve does not himself discuss Pullman abstention. But Professor Redish criticizes it as illegitimate. See Redish, supra note 12, at 75-76 (citing Pullman as one of
several abstention doctrines, each of which "could be characterized as a judicial usur-
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conveniens law is viewed by Shreve, quite understandably, as a doctrine of judicial administration.7 0 But if an American court refuses to
entertain an action and remits the parties to another tribunal that
seems quite likely, ex ante, to reach a different outcome-notably
when the other forum is overseas and would not, for example, employ
common law juries, recognize American style class actions, follow the
American rule on attorney's fees, or apply American substantive law
on pain and suffering or punitive damages in tort cases-the "administrative" objective may carry important political overtones.
Perhaps most fundamentally, as Shreve himself notes, 7 every decision by Congress to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in a
particular category of cases can be viewed as resting on the belief that
those courts are "better," in some relevant sense, than the state courts.
(Indeed, were that not so, it is not clear why Congress would ever want
to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction; relying exclusively on the
state courts, subject to Supreme Court review, would eliminate the befuddling complexities arising from the pervasive overlap of federal
court and state court jurisdiction.) And most if not all the respects in
which Congress might view federal courts as "better" would presumably be deemed "political" by Shreve. Thus, whenever a federal court
declines to exercise jurisdiction, even for reasons of 'judicial administration," a value judgment is being made that the importance of the
posited basis for declination outweighs any preference for federal adjudication embodied in the congressional grant of jurisdiction. Most
any declination, then, can be seen as political, in the sense that the
court, after due regard for the political considerations underlying
congressional action, finds those considerations insufficiently forceful
to merit the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
The point here is not simply that this effort to limit or reformulate Shapiro's position does not improve it. More fundamentally, if
one embraces a lawmaking role for courts in rounding out the edges
of jurisdictional enactments, that role will inevitably involve courts in
making decisions that might be variously characterized as substantive,
controversial, value-laden, or political. The larger question, I believe,
is what can be said about the appropriateness of that role?

pation of legislative authority, in violation of the principle of separation of powers");
id. at 79, 90 (viewing Pullmanabstention as a less serious usurpation because it, unlike
other abstention doctrines, does not preclude but merely delays the exercise of federal jurisdiction).
70 Shreve, supra note 20, at 802-03.
71 Id. at 784-87.
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JUDICIAL DISCRETION EXPLORED: PREDICTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY

Questions about broad judicial authority to make law can be help-

fully separated into distinct but overlapping questions. Frank
Michelman has recently suggested that in assessing the extent to
which legal decisionmaking is constrained, one can identify several
different goals that we ask legal decisionmakers to promote: to settle

disputes, to provide predictability and stability in legal doctrines, and
to establish morally appropriate and justifiable outcomes. 72 Dispute
settlement seems the easiest of these three aspirations for judges to
achieve; when cases are filed in their courts, judges usually succeed in
overseeing a process that ultimately resolves the dispute. 73 But given
the pervasive recognition that judicial decisionmaking, in general, is
only relatively constrained,7 4 it is predictability and stability in legal
doctrines, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of decisionmaking
(and in this case, of judicial decisionmaking in particular), on the
other, that pose the more difficult challenges for the judicial role that
Shapiro endorses.

A.

Predictability and Stability

Judicial rounding out of jurisdictional statutes plainly creates a
possibility that the resulting doctrine may be sufficiently uncertain or
indeterminate as to fail to provide adequate guidance to litigants
about where disputes may and may not be filed. Before offering some
observations about particular doctrines, let me first address the question of how important predictability is in this context.
No one favors lack of clarity in legal doctrine, but for primary
actors, predictability in jurisdictional doctrines is considerably less im75
portant than predictability about rules governing primary conduct.

72 Frank I. Michelman, Relative Constraintand Public Reason: What Is "The Work We
Expect of Law"?, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 963, 964-66 (2002).
73 Of course, effective dispute resolution presupposes reasonable expedition,
which may be impaired if legal doctrines are relatively indeterminate and consequently difficult to litigate and subject to greater likelihood of appellate reversal.
Some have suggested that this is a particular problem with respect to abstention doctrines. See, e.g., Lee & Wilkins, supra note 12, at 337 ("It has become commonplace
for commentators to criticize abstention, which often requires numerous round trips
by litigants between state and federal courts, as inefficient and wasteful."). I discuss
these problems below.
74 Michelman, supranote 72, at 963-64; see also STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN
THE FOREST 316 (2001).

75

For one illustration of this point (albeit a somewhat elliptical one), see

HART

&

WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 22 (Supp. 2003) (noting the absence of strong reliance

interests on the shape of the jurisdictional doctrine of complete preemption).
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Businesses and individuals may tailor their conduct to tort or contract
or statutory doctrines to ensure compliance with legal requirements
or to take advantage of legal opportunities.7 6 It is far less likely that
primary actors will conform their conduct to doctrines governing
which court will exercise jurisdiction. Less likely, of course, does not
mean impossible; one can conjure up counter-examples. In a heated
civil rights protest or political dispute, the differences between state
and federal courts in a particular locality could be so sharp and predictable that an actor might be willing to undertake conduct if, but
only if, any dispute would be heard by a federal but not a state court
(or vice versa). Perhaps in some commercial contexts, the differences
in the sensibilities of juries matters importantly (as in the preference
of plaintiffs' class action lawyers for venue in Madison County, Illinois7 7 ), and insofar as business decisions may be based on anticipated
liabilities, a decided difference in the likely liability could affect a rational calculus. Could, but is not likely to; in a world of bounded rationality, effects such as these are likely to be limited and muted.
The point is not that forum choice does not matter; indeed it
does, which is why so much jockeying in litigation concerns forum
choice. But again, it is not clear how that translates into ex ante incentives. In many instances, forum selection ex post involves a choice
not simply between adjudicative systems but between particular
judges. For example, when one is deciding whether to remove a state
court litigation that is already before a particular judge,78 even if one
does not know to which federal judge the case might be removed, one
can compare the individual state court judge with an array of possible
federaljudges. Moreover, litigation may have the effect of concentrating the mind; human actors often lack perfect foresight and surely
Shapiro himself has made this point in a different context, relating to the scope
of discretion granted under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing Pre-Trial Conferences. That rule, he notes, does not determine "rights and
liabilities of people in their everyday affairs, and thus predictability in gross seems less
important than the proper fit between the action taken and the needs of the case."
David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1969, 1998 (1989).
76 On whether academics have exaggerated this effect, see EDWARD A. PURCELL,
JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 253-54 (2000).
77 See, e.g.,
John H. Beisner &Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a FederalCase
Out of It ... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 169-85 (2001).
78 See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967,
1002 (1999) (concluding that "debtors shopped to New York and now shop to Delaware in large part to secure particular judges or to avoid judges in their home
districts").
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often see things in hindsight that they might have but failed to focus
on initially. 79 Finally, a considerable amount of forum choice is dictated by the preferences of lawyers rather than those of their clients.
For all of these reasons, I suspect that uncertainty about jurisdictional
doctrine is not likely to have significant ex ante effects on primary
behavior.
A different kind of reliance, however, occurs within the litigation
itself. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the rules of most
states encourage early determination ofjurisdiction,8 0 partly for legalistic reasons (how can a court begin to adjudicate without having first
assured itself and the parties that it has power to do so?), but also for
intensely pragmatic ones (it is wasteful to invest time and money in
adjudication that may come to naught if it later turns out that the
court lacked power to hear the case). There is also a strong tradition,
drawing on those pragmatic concerns, urging that jurisdictional rules
be clear.8 1 The judicial role that Shapiro advocates might be thought
to cut against that tradition.
Shapiro addresses this objection directly in Jurisdictionand Discretion. He defends a conception of measured judicial discretion, in
which courts, having been vested with discretion by Congress, determine whether to exercise it in a particular case not upon whim or ad
hoc decision but rather upon "criteria drawn from the relevant statutory or constitutional grant ofjurisdiction or from the tradition within
which the grant arose."8 2 He stresses that the criteria must be "capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by
83
critics of the courts' work, and reviewed by the legislative branch,"
and that the discretion he endorses "carries with it an obligation of
reasoned and articulated decision ... that can therefore exist within a
regime of law." 84 Finally, he stresses that over time, judicial decisions

narrow the bounds of existing discretion, providing predictability for
85
the future.
This conception of adjudication clearly resonates with the Legal
Process school, and Shapiro has in fact described himself "[a] s a continuing believer in the value of the lessons taught by the legal process
79 Cf HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 81-83 (3d ed. 1976) (discussing bounded rationality and the limited capacities of human decisionmakers).
80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h).
81 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 1-102 (1950).
82 Shapiro, supra note 5, at 578.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 579.
85 Id. at 546-47, 589.
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theorists."8 6 His position, then, entails several distinct though related
notions. First, it views Congress, when enacting jurisdictional grants,
as not seeking, and appropriately not seeking, complete advance specification. Second, it views courts rather than legislatures as the appropriate institution to provide fine-grained specification. Third, it views
Congress as having implicitly authorized such post hoc specification
by courts. And finally, it rests on confidence that judicial elaboration
of the reasons for jurisdictional decisions will eventually generate a
body of law that is reasonably determinate. I am sympathetic to these
commitments,8 7 but wish to test them by looking at three jurisdictional doctrines that have figured importantly in the debate over jurisdiction and discretion.
The first doctrine is so-called Younger abstention.8 8 Here, the
Court has succeeded in developing a doctrinal framework with relatively determinate boundaries. The Younger case itself is just over
thirty years old (though it had important antecedents8 9 ), and within a
reasonably short time the Court elaborated a set of additional decisions that gave the doctrine considerable detail and specification in
just the way that Shapiro envisioned. 90 Indeed, by the time that the
Burger Court gave way to the Rehnquist Court, the framework was
largely in place: the federal courts should abstain when there are
pending state court proceedings brought by the state-or, in rare instances, state proceedings between private litigants that affect important state interests.9 ' There is much to be debated about the merits of
these decisions, and in my judgment a sound basis for criticism of a
good number of them. But at least on grounds of stability and predictability, they fare reasonably well. Like all doctrines, they have
some soft spots and uncertainties, but the lines drawn are reasonably
lawlike and predictable.
A different example is so-called Pullman abstention. 92 Nearly
twice the age of Younger, Pullman abstention has been harder to do86

David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,74 VA. L. REV. 519, 521

(1988).
87 See Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 18, at 343.
88 SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
89 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1221-25; Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 636 (1979).
90 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1227-58 (discussing the
Younger decision and subsequent developments).
91
See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 30 n.2 (1987);Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327 (1977).
92 R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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mesticate into formally realizable rules. As David Currie aptly observed many years ago,
the delays and added cost of abstention, which have been chronicled in hideous detail, give the practice a Bleak House aspect that in
my mind is too high a price to pay for the gains in avoiding error,
friction, and constitutional questions. Last of all, if the question
were a close one, I think the balance would be swung by the time
saved if federal courts did not have to go through the troubles of

deciding whether or not to abstain-an issue whose difficulty is attested to by the substantial number of Supreme Court decisions attempting with only limited success to define the limits of the
93
doctrine.
I am confident that a judiciary composed of David Shapiros would
exercise discretion in a fashion that was sensible and perhaps that
would become clear over time, but that is a different judiciary from
94
the one that we have.
One might respond that any uncertainty in the articulated criteria for Pullman abstention matters less if, as noted earlier, primary actors rely little if at all on jurisdictional doctrine. And one way to
reduce the litigation costs, and particularly the serious cost when jurisdictional decisions are reversed on appeal, is to confer a different
form of discretion upon district judges. Shapiro discusses a form of
discretion that he calls "allocative" discretion-the "delegation of decision-making authority within a particular hierarchy (here, the judiciary) "-which is distinct from the discretion that is his primary
concern, "normative" discretion-discretion delegated by the legislature to the judiciary.9 5 In the case of Pullman abstention, the district
courts have been given a measure of allocative discretion, for, although the decisions of the courts of appeals do not line up perfectly,
the clear weight of authority establishes abuse of discretion as the basic standard of review. 9 6 That limited scope for appellate review
93

David P. Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute (Part I), 36 U.
L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) (footnote omitted).
94 See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361, 373-76 (1985);
Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1026, 1034-35
CHI.

(2003).
95 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 546.
96 A number of circuits have simply stated that review is for abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We review a decision to
abstain and stay proceedings under Pullman for abuse of discretion."); Pittman v.
Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1285 (1lth Cir. 2001) ("We review a district court's decision to
abstain on Pullman grounds for an abuse of discretion."). Others follow that same
standard in general but add particular qualifications. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 283 F.3d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 2002) ("We
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clearly reduces the likelihood that a district court's decision whether
to abstain will be reversed.
But insofar as the only way to assure that unpredictable decisions
cause little harm is substantially to insulate district court decisions
from appellate review, it comes at a serious cost. As Professor Rosenberg has noted, deeply rooted in our concept of the rule of law is the
notion that trial court decisions are not unreviewable and that losing
97
litigants have at least one opportunity to seek appellate correction.
Judge Friendly has also stressed the benefits of multi-member appellate panels with a broader range of experience than a single trial
judge, as well as the centrality of the notion of equal treatment,98 a
notion that cannot be fully realized if disparate trial court judgments
are subject to sharply limited review. Finally, the "governance costs"
of establishing some consistency among courts rise when large numbers of actors (lower federal court judges) are charged with fashioning a consistent doctrine.9 9
I have always been sympathetic to the critique of Pullman voiced
by Currie. And Currie is hardly alone. In 1977, my colleague Martha
Field, who had several years earlier written what remains the most
comprehensive study of Pullman abstention, 10 0 came to the conclusion that "Pullman abstention is not worth its costs."''1 1 Field sugreview an abstention for abuse of discretion. The exercise of discretion must fit within
the narrow and specific limits prescribed by the particular abstention doctrine involved. A court necessarily abuses its discretion when it abstains outside of the doctrine's strictures."); Beavers v. Ark. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 151 F.3d 838, 840
(8th Cir. 1998) ("We review the district court's decision to abstain for an abuse of
discretion .... 'The underlying legal questions, however, are subject to plenary review."') (quoting Sheebonnet, Ltd. v. Am. Express Bank, Ltd., 17 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir
1994)) (internal citations omitted); Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 770 (3d Cir. 1995)
("We review the district court's decision to abstain for abuse of discretion, but the
district court's analysis of the law on abstention is subject to de novo review."). But see
Moe v. Dinkins, 635 F.2d 1045, 1048 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that appellate courts
"have used a more searching standard of review [than abuse of discretion], and have
reversed abstention orders whenever convinced the decision was improper or
wrong").
97 Maurice Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 641-42 (1971).

98 See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 756-58
(1982).
99 Cf Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DuKE UJ. 1, 20-22 (1992) (noting that where a rule must be agreed upon by a number of rulemakers, its formulation entails costs).
100 See Martha A. Field, Abstention in ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
101 Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 605
(1977).
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gested that if state court input on issues of state law is needed,
certification is available. She seems right to me that "[t]he balance
between costs and benefits . ..leaves certification well ahead of ab-

stention."10 2 While not going as far as Field would go, the Supreme
Court has also observed that certification is a vastly preferable procedural route.10 3 And today, virtually every state now authorizes its
courts to hear certified questions,10 4 although the statutes have some
limits and the process does not always work smoothly.10 5 (Nor, insofar
as certification is being invoked when Pullman abstention might have
been, does the swifter and cleaner procedural route eliminate the uncertainties inherent in application of the doctrine's criteria.)
Strictly speaking, the sponginess of jurisdictional criteria like
those governing Pullman abstention is not necessarily a byproduct of
the kind of judicial discretion that Shapiro favors; statutes, after all,
can embody explicitly articulated standards that are spongy and uncertain in their application. But the thrust of Shapiro's article is that
judges have the capacity to engage in more refined analyses, in the
context of a particular case, than Congress can when enacting a general statute. And whenever a decision becomes more complex, refined, and multi-dimensional, it affords greater opportunity for
decisionmakers to miscalculate or misapprehend and for the resulting
10 6
doctrinal pattern to be more uncertain.
There will always, then, be the question whether the additional
value added by the refinements that judges can provide is worth the
cost. Pullman abstention has always seemed to me to be a close case in
this respect, but for many years I have been doubtful that the game is
worth the candle. Any difference in this respect between Shapiro and
me when Jurisdictionand Discretionwas published in 1985, however, has
narrowed considerably insofar as abstention today is tending to
morph into certification and insofar as certification processes prove,
10 7
in general, to work reasonably smoothly.
102 Id. at 607. Certification is not without its critics. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Cochran,
FederalCourt Certificationof Questions of State Law to State Courts: A Theoreticaland Empirical Study, 29J. LEGIS. 157 (2003); Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question
29 SUFFOLK
.... U. L. REV. 677, 681-82 n.19 (1995) (citing cases where state courts
refuse to answer certified questions but offer little or no explanation).

103
104
105

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997).
See, e.g.,
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1201 n.5.
See id. at 1200-03.

106

See FREDERICK

SCHAUER, PLAYING

BY

A PHILOSOPHICAL
149-50 (1991).
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EXAMINATION

107 For a recent endorsement of certification by a distinguished federal judge, see
Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1293, 1307 (2003).
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A final example of the exercise of discretion, one highlighted by
Shapiro, is the scope of "arising under" or federal question jurisdiction set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.108 Justice Holmes famously argued
that the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction embraced only
cases in which federal law creates the cause of action, 10 9 but his position has not carried the day. Instead, federal question jurisdiction
also reaches some, but not all, cases in which there is a federal ingredient embedded in a state law cause of action. 110 Shapiro suggests that
no formulation can account for the pattern of decisional law "unless it
accords sufficient room for the federal courts to make a range of
choices based on considerations ofjudicial administration and the degree of federal concern."'11 And he appears to approve of that approach, as well as the principal applications of it by the Supreme
Court as of the time that he wrote in 1985.112 The following year, the
Supreme Court endorsed his approach in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Thompson, 113 where the majority approvingly cited Shapiro as
one of several commentators endorsing the proposition "that our
§ 1331 decisions can best be understood as an evaluation of the nature
114
of the federal interest at stake."
Here, too, I am entirely confident that I would be happy in a
world in which the existence of federal question jurisdiction was decided by David Shapiro. But academics are experts in a way that
generalist federal judges are not,1 1 5 and many academics are unusually good analysts. (Many academics, I should hasten to add, are entirely lacking in other qualities necessary to be a good judge.)
Academics may also, as Peter Schuck has suggested, have a taste, as a
matter of professional inclination, for complexity.' 1 6 The question remains whether the men and women who comprise the federal bench
have been or will be able to craft a sufficiently determinate body of
doctrine by following the approach that Shapiro proposes.
108 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 566-70.
109 See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916); see
also Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214-15 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[F]or it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under the
law of the United States [for federal question jurisdiction to exist].")
110 Compare, e.g., Smith, 255 U.S. at 202 (recognizing jurisdiction), with Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (finding no jurisdiction).
111 Shapiro, supra note 5, at 568 (footnote omitted).
112 Id. at 568-70 & nn.150-62.
113 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
114 Id. at 814 n.12.
115 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101
MICH. L. REV. 885, 888 (2003).
116 Schuck, supra note 99, at 34-38.
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Here, as elsewhere, I think that underlying Shapiro's work is an
implicit confidence in the capacity of judges. As Larry Alexander has
suggested, "[t]hose who favor rules are somewhat pessimistic about
the abilities of those who must decide under norms. Those who favor
standards are optimists." 117 Alexander goes on to suggest that "what
explains the optimists' embracing of standards is often that they are
picturing as the decisionmakers either themselves, persons very much
like themselves ... or persons they advise."' 18 I think Shapiro may at
times be just a little too sanguine that judicial discretion will be exercised in a fashion that will be conducive to predictable, stable, and
relatively expeditious and efficient decisionmaking, 119 and decisions
under § 1331 are one place to test that suggestion.
An opening observation is that, in looking atjudicial discretion in
rounding out the boundaries of § 1331, Shapiro focuses on Supreme
Court decisions. That is, of course, customary in this field as in many
others. But the Court's decisions (and on this subject, they are few in
number) may be significantly unrepresentative of decisions generally.
The Justices, at least today's Justices, are an unusually smart group of
judges who focus (by comparison to other judges) on an unusually
small number of cases, with assistance from an unusually talented set
of law clerks and from briefs whose average quality far exceeds that
seen in the lower federal courts. But even in these favorable conditions, scholars often find that the Court's analysis of jurisdictional re1 20
finements falls short.
117 Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass IXSunstein's Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531, 543 (1997) (book
review).
118 Id.
119 Moreover, as Fred Schauer has noted, a decisionmaking process that never errs
may, nonetheless, be so complex, costly, or uncertain ex ante as to be less desirable
than an alternative system composed of relatively simple rules that, precisely by suppressing consideration of what might be viewed as pertinent considerations, permits
cleaner and more inexpensive decisionmaking. See SCHAUER, supra note 106, at
146-49.
120 Consider, for example, the discussion in the Merrell Dow opinions of an earlier
precedent on the scope of arising under jurisdiction, Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934). Moore was a state law tort action that incorporated
issues of federal law, and the Supreme Court ruled that the case did not arise under
federal law. Id. at 217. The majority in MerrellDow explained Moore as a case in which
"the violation of the federal standard as an element of state tort recovery did not
fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action" and hence federal law was
relatively unimportant. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814-15
n.12 (1986). The dissent, by contrast, argued that any effort to distinguish Moore from
other decisions on the basis of the unimportance of the federal interest was "infinitely
malleable" and inappropriate, and viewed Moore as a "sport," a moribund decision
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In the lower courts, the analytical shortcomings are more evident
still. To illustrate the point, I would note a recent commentary published in 2002, which found that since 1994, there were sixty-nine decisions of the federal courts of appeals discussing the existence of
jurisdiction under § 1331 when there was not a federal cause of action. 12 1 In forty-five of those sixty-nine cases-fully sixty-five percent-the district court's jurisdictional determination was reversed on
appeal.1 2 2 It goes without saying1 23 that reported cases are a small
subset of all cases and reported appeals a still smaller subset. Nonetheless, even acknowledging these sample biases, a reversal rate of
nearly two out of three is extremely disquieting.
I have had occasion to read a fair number of those sixty-nine decisions, and I think it is fair to say that one finds some surprising statements in them. Overall, the decisions leave me, at least, doubtful
whether federal judges, as intelligent and dedicated as most of them
are, can in fact establish a coherent framework for the boundaries of
subject matter jurisdiction predicated not upon a federal claim for
relief but instead upon a federal ingredient in a state law claim for
relief. These decisions also suggest to me that while, as Shapiro
stresses, 124 the exercise of discretion often generates precedents that
narrow the reach of future discretion and establish a stable framework
of law (as, I indicated above, has happened with respect to Younger
1 25
abstention), sometimes that process is far less successful.
that was ripe for overruling. Id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Shapiro himself
would, I think, contend that both opinions missed the key point: Moore was simply a
case in which the federal issue, however important it was deemed to be, did not arise
on the well-pleaded complaint. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 882.
121 Note, supra note 20, at 2280.
122 Id.
123 Why, then, am I saying it?
124 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 589; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557, 577-79 (1992) (arguing that once courts establish a precedent, subsequent proceedings follow that precedent instead of engaging in a general analysis).
125 One could find other stories of judicial success and judicial failure in administering this form of discretion in making jurisdictional determinations. To take one
example, consider this comment on Burford abstention:
I agree with David Shapiro that judicial discretion regarding jurisdiction is
not entirely bad. There are good reasons to allow the federal courts to fine
tune their jurisdiction. But I also agree with his conclusion that discretion as
to the exercise ofjurisdiction ought to be principled. There is no principle
in a contradiction. Over its lifetime, Burford has often seemed close to a
contradiction, at least as it has been reflected in the lower court decisions
before the New Orleans decision. One could read New Orleans and Ankenbrandt, decided just three years apart, as making directly contradictory state-
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As is true of nearly anything that one could say about Shapiro's

work, this is not a problem that has not occurred to him. In a commentary on an article by Professor Martin Redish about the allocation
of subject matter jurisdiction, 1 26 he suggested that Redish was "less
willing than I am to live with complexity and a certain amount of fuzziness at the margins." 127 Shapiro acknowledged the power of the argu128
ment that jurisdictional rules should be simple and easy to apply,
but added that he thought complexity and fuzziness are "not only inevitable but even desirable in giving room for flexibility, fine-tuning,
recognition of difference, and accommodation of unforseen
1

developments."

29

Shapiro's commentary on Redish argues against a suggested
bright-line rule providing that a case would arise under federal law
not only when the cause of action is itself federally created, but also
whenever the decision may turn on the interpretation or application
of federal law. 130 In objecting to that proposal, Shapiro correctly
notes that such an approach might vastly expand the scope of federal
courtjurisdiction.' 3 1 The harder question, I think, is whether to move
in the other direction and accept a different bright-line rule-that of
Justice Holmes, who would have restricted federal question jurisdiction to federal causes of action. Resisting that approach, Shapiro correctly notes that under the approach he favors, the hard cases in
which § 1331 jurisdiction might be invoked in the absence of a federal
ments about the applicability of Burford abstention to cases not involving
state administrative agencies. At one pole, most Burford cases allude to the
Cohens v. Virginia view that statutorily conferred federal jurisdiction is
mandatory. At the other pole, the Burford formula has often proved so malleable that virtually any case involving unclear state public law arguably fits
its mold.
Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law from Burford to
Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years ofJudicialFederalism under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred
Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 972 (1993) (citations omitted)
126 Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation ofJudicialBusiness Between State and
Federal Courts: FederalJurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769
(1992).
127 David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation ofJurisdictionBetween State and Federal Courts: A Response to "Reassessing the Allocation ofJudicial Business Between State
and Federal Courts," 78 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1841 (1992).
128 Id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 5, at 567 ("[O]riginal [as distinguished from
.
appellate] jurisdiction is best determined at the outset of the case ...
129 Shapiro, supra note 127, at 1841.
130 See id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 5, at 566-70 (rejecting such a proposal and
arguing for an approach that affords federal courts the opportunity to dictate their
own judicial administration).
131 See Shapiro, supra note 127, at 1841.
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cause of action are few and thus any resulting uncertainty is limited in
scope. 32 But if the costs of a more complex approach are realized in
133
a relatively small fraction of cases, so, too, are the benefits.
Holmes's rule would exclude from federal court a few cases-like
Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co.134-whose decision by federal
courts under the federal question jurisdiction would seem to most observers to be appropriate and even important. But that observation
alone cannot carry the day, for it is in the nature of a rule that "its
terms control the decision even in those cases in which [the rule's] general1 35
ization failed to serve its underlyingjustification."

Insofar as I disagree with Shapiro, it is largely at the margin. I
generally share his confidence in judicial capacity. 136 The question
here (and as Holmes liked to remind us, the question in most areas of
the law 1 37) is one of degree. Shapiro does acknowledge, but does not

greatly emphasize, concerns "that judges might mistake legislative purposes; that they might do better by deferring to legislators' expressed
judgments about equity than by enforcing their own; that they might,
by treating statutes flexibly, be purchasing case-specific benefits at the
price of increased uncertainty, imposing resulting burdens on the interpretive system." 138 I have come to the view that the case-specific
benefits of efforts to develop and apply a refined interpretation of
§ 1331 of the kind that Shapiro and the Supreme Court both recommend comes at too high a price in uncertainty.
B.

Discretion and Legitimacy

A decent measure of predictability may be a necessary condition
for a functioning legal system, but it is not a sufficient one. Legal
rules, however determinate they may be, must also be viewed as legitimate. Shapiro, of course, believes that the role he advocates is a legiti132

See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 568 n.149.

133 Cf SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 140-42 (noting that rules, by their nature,
produce suboptimal results, and that the costs of suboptimality depend on the frequency of such results and their consequences).
134 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
135 SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 49. Indeed, as Schauer later observes, the idea of a
rule "is possible only if formulated generalizations can have meanings differing from
the result that a direct application of the justification behind a rule would generate

on a particular occasion." Id. at 61.
136

See Meltzer, JudicialPassivity, supra note 18 passim.

137 See, e.g.,
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[M]ost of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of
degree.").
138 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 115, at 892.
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mate one for judges. And although the majority of his attention in
Jurisdiction and Discretion is devoted to demonstrating the range and
nature of discretion that has been exercised, Shapiro's article includes
a normative defense of that tradition.
Judicial lawmaking, and judicial lawmaking by federal judges in
particular, sometimes faces an uphill battle in gaining recognition as
legitimate. By contrast, the Constitution's specification of the statutory lawmaking process, and the democratic accountability that underlies it, confers considerable legitimacy on congressional enactments.
Those processes are hardly without their flaws. One may think that
partisan gerrymandering is a serious and growing concern; that, even
after the McConnell decision,1 39 monied interests figure too heavily in
the political process; or that legislators often make decisions that are
partisan, self-interested, foolish, or cruel. But even so, few doubt that
congressional enactments deserve to be viewed as politically
140
legitimate.
Judges, by contrast, lack the patina of legitimacy that elections,
however flawed their processes, confer. Thus, judicial lawmaking has
to acquire legitimacy in other ways, and federal judicial lawmaking
raises concerns along both separation of powers and federalism
dimensions. 14 1 The problem of legitimacy, of course, is most acute in
139 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
140 See Meltzer, JudicialPassivity, supra note 18, at 378-79; cf John Hart Ely, Foreword: On DiscoveringFundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 49-50 (1978):
Sophisticated commentary never tires of reminding us that legislatures are
only imperfectly democratic. Beyond the fact that the appropriate answer
there is to make them more democratic, however, the point is one that may
on analysis backfire. In fact the existing antimajoritarian influences in Congress and the state legislatures, capable though they may be of blocking legislation, are not well situated to get legislation passed in the face of majority
opposition. That makes all the more untenable the suggestion under consideration, that courts should invalidate legislation in the name of a supposed contrary consensus. Beyond that, however, we may grant until we're
blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly democratic, but that isn't going to make courts more democratic than legislatures.
Id. at 49-50 (footnotes omitted). Legislative rules have other advantages. They often
rest on fuller and different kinds of investigation than judges undertake. Legislatures
have a broader range of techniques available and are free to make arbitrary decisions
when necessary. And legislation typically clarifies the law up front, saving lawyers,
clients, and the legal system the multiple costs of uncertainty. These are points that
Shapiro has noted in other writing. See Shapiro, supra note 86, at 551-58; see also
Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the
Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 123, 126-30 (1992) (outlining the
many costs of statutory ambiguity).
141 See Meltzer, JudicialPassivity, supra note 18, at 378.

2004]

JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION REVISITED

1917

constitutional decisionmaking, where decisions are most open-ended
and are, for all practical purposes, irreversible. But even with regard
to subconstitutional matters, like those addressed by Shapiro, the
question of the legitimacy of lawmaking by federal judges inevitably
arises.
It is hard for any body of judicially-fashioned law to be viewed as
legitimate without some sense that, as a general matter, the legal rules
are correct. 1 42 Correctness with respect to judicial rounding out of
statutes seems at a minimum to require a measure of fidelity to legislative supremacy, as Shapiro himself stresses. 143 But application of that
criterion itself raises hard questions: What does it mean to render a
decision faithful to a legislature? Can judges in fact render decisions
faithful to the legislature? Even if they can, are they likely to do so, or
are other motivations likely to move them in other directions?
On this dimension, too, Shapiro's allegiance with the Legal Process school is apparent. For he clearly believes that one can identify
purposes associated with legislation, a key premise of the Legal Pro45
cess school. 144 A sophisticated student of statutory interpretation,
he is well aware of the standard concerns about the difficulties of identifying a purpose or set of purposes underlying a statute, given that
statutory purposes can be framed in varying degrees of generality and
are often multiple, conflicting, and only partially realized, and that
statutory enactments may embody the balance of interest group forces
more than the implementation of public purposes. 14 6 Nonetheless, I
think it is fair to say that his inclination is to search for an identifiable
and sensible public purpose rather than to view a statute as merely the
end product of a political battle reflecting the distribution of raw
power.
For example, in an article discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure more generally,
Shapiro, while acknowledging the difficulty of ascribing purposes to
142
143
144

See Michelman, supra note 72, at 970.
See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 547.
See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT

M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.

& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
145

See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67

N.Y.U. L. REv. 921 (1992).
146 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1846:
While much legislation represents a carefully-wrought compromise between
conflicting forces-a compromise that might be perverted or even wrecked
by a refusal to adhere to the text-this criminal statute is surely more sensibly viewed as an over-general prohibition enacted by a legislature that, at
least implicitly, contemplated the necessity of judicial fine-tuning.
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legislation (or, in this case, to a federal rule of procedure), ends up
reasonably comfortable in doing so:
Although lawyers and judges do it all the time, it is not easy to
talk about the "purposes" of a group of people. To some extent, of
course, individuals share a common purpose when they act together. But it is just as true that, unless the speech were written for
them, no two members of the group would give the same account,
to himself or others, of why it is acting. Of course, the articulated
goals of the leaders of the group are likely, with good reason, to
receive the greatest weight in any analysis, but leaders too may differ
among themselves, and may have goals they are unwilling to elaborate on in public.
Nevertheless, the published (and to a significant extent the unpublished) history of the federal rules, and the common sense of
the situation the rulemakers were in, justify certain conclusions
about what they thought they were up to. Indeed, I very much
doubt that there would be significant disagreement about the major
goals they were seeking to achieve, or the assumptions that underlay
14 7
their actions.
The Federal Rules process, of course, is a distinctive kind of legislative process. While it is not entirely free from the play of interest
group politics, conflicting purposes and statutory compromise (principled or not),148 few would doubt that there are comprehensible purposes that underlie it. Even so, Shapiro, in his article on Rule 16, is
more explicit than in Jurisdiction and Discretion about the possibility
that judges, seeking to round out a legislative rule, will not always do
so in a way that is faithful to the purposes of those who promulgated
the rules:
The evolution of Rule 16 is a story repeated in the evolution of
many rules of open-textured quality. The framers have a general
idea of what they want to achieve, and adoption of the rule is followed by some developments that constitute just what was intended,
by some that raise questions not focused on by the framers but that
they would happily have accepted (or would be likely to accept if
they were able to reflect on current conditions), and by some that
might well horrify them no matter how cognizant they were of con149
textual change.

147

See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 1972 (footnotes omitted).

148 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Callfor a
Moratorium,59 BROOK. L. REV'. 841 (1993); Richard L. Marcus, OfBabies and Bathwater:
The Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993).
149 See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 1992-93.
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Still, in the end Shapiro suggests that delegation to judges of substantial discretion under Rule 16 was both authorized and appropriatein this case
not only because the Rule was an innovative one, but because cases
do vary in ways that are difficult to spell out in advance, because
judges vary in their ability and willingness to make effective use of
such techniques, and because 'local legal cultures' vary in their re1 50
ceptiveness to certain techniques and practices.
When one turns to Jurisdiction and Discretion, one finds less explicit recognition of the possibility that judicial decisionmaking may
misfire, and instead a set of reasons elaborated to justify the judicial
role that Shapiro favors: (1) jurisdiction is difficult to define in
gross; 15' (2) "courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the
necessary fine tuning than is the legislature;" 152 and (3) the law of
'jurisdiction [is] of special concern to the courts because [it] intimately affect[s] the courts' relations with each other as well as with
the other branches of government."' 53 In addition, he notes two reasons why the exercise of such discretion should not be unduly troublesome: (1) if the court is to decline to entertain an action, it must
overcome a principle of preference for adjudication by providing "an
explanation based on the language of the grant, the historical context
in which the grant was made, or the common law tradition behind
it;"' 5 4 and (2) criteria followed by the courts must be "capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by critics
of the courts' work, and reviewed by the legislative branch."1 55
Some of these considerations appear to be specific to the determination of jurisdiction. If federal judges are generalist judges and
ignorance is an occupational hazard for generalists, the hazards posed
by jurisdictional issues may be less serious. Such issues tend to recur,
and they involve conduct within rather than outside of courts, making
judges somewhat more like specialists and increasing their claim to
have a comparative advantage vis-A-vis the legislature. Indeed, Judge
Posner contends that specialized courts, "[h]aving a stronger sense
than generalists of how the issues in cases within their jurisdiction
should be decided .... are more likely to see themselves as helping
150
151
152
153
154
155
lated

Id. at 1995.
Shapiro, supra note 5, at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 578; see also id. at 579 (speaking of "an obligation of reasoned and articudecision").
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the legislature achieve the goals of a program than as being obliged to

1
stop with the legislative text."

56

But my sense is that Shapiro's faith in judicial capacity extends
well beyond lawmaking that involves the procedural and jurisdictional
rules concerning adjudication. For example, in other writing he has
applauded the opinion of Justice Harlan in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc.,15 7 where the court took on the responsibility of adjusting
the common law of admiralty to a changed statutory framework concerning wrongful death15 8-a position that others have criticized as
substitutingjudicial for legislative judgment about the scope of wrongful death remedies. 159 And in an introduction to a symposium revisiting Lon Fuller's great article, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,160
Shapiro, commenting on one of the contributor's arguments against
judicial recognition of common law defenses to statutory crimes,
asked the following questions-which, if not entirely rhetorical, at
least suggest to me a clear point of view:
Should the courts regard themselves only as messengers when applying the broad language of a statute to a particular problem as

long as the words used are "plain"? Should it matter that the legislature, in the light of centuries of experience, may have come to expect the process of interpretation to comprise elements of both
agency (the court as applier of the legislature's mandates) and partnership (the court as fine tuner of the legislature's general, and
61
sometimes overly general, proscriptions and commands)?

156 See Richard A. Posner, Reply: The InstitutionalDimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation,101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 964 (2003) (making this point with regard

to the law of evidence). Posner is not entirely clear whether he endorses the phenomenon that he describes. Insofar as federal courts view themselves as having greater
interpretive latitude in particular areas of expertise, they may take on that role free
from some of the other drawbacks that accompany specialized courts-proliferation
of jurisdictions and special attractiveness to interest groups to invest in seeking to
influence the behavior and appointment of such judges. See, e.g., NEIL K KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 145 (1994); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 331-32 (1991); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized
Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REv. 377, 379-82;Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheersfor Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 89 (1995).

157
158

398 U.S. 375 (1970).
See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 953.

159 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 179, 203 (1986).
160 Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).

161

See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1843.
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Thus, Shapiro's faith in judicial decisionmaking extends broadly-as
indeed do the principal considerations that he adduces in defending
such decisionmaking.
That is a faith that I share, and in a recent article,1 62 I sought to
consider and respond to concerns about the kind of robust judicial
role that Shapiro proposes. Let me try to summarize some of the observations I made there-observations that are inspired in no small
part by Shapiro's work 163 and that may help to reinforce and perhaps
elaborate on the argument in Jurisdiction and Discretion.
A starting point, one also stressed by Shapiro 164 and already mentioned, is a recognition of the limits of congressional foresight. Certainly it is hard, as Shapiro notes, to imagine that when Congress first
enacted diversity jurisdiction in 1789,165 jurisdiction over civil rights
actions in 1871,166 or the general federal question jurisdiction in
1875,167 it could have anticipated the particulars involved in the rich
set of interactions between those statutory grants of jurisdiction and
the concerns that Shapiro identifies as appropriate for the guidance
of judges in exercising those jurisdictions-concerns of equitable discretion, federalism and comity, separation of powers, and judicial
administration.

168

But the limited capacity of Congress to legislate in detail is not
simply a product of cognitive or imaginative limitations of the men
and women who inhabit the legislative branch of a developed government. It is that in part, but it is also a particularly acute problem in
the American system of government, for an interrelated set of reasons.
One is simply the vast scale of legislation and regulation that falls
at the doorstep of Congress.
Whether one compares today's Congress to that of 1789 (or indeed,
to that of any era in our past), or to the legislature of any other
nation in the world, the magnitude of the job of lawmaking imposed on our House and Senate is rivaled by few other legislative
162 See Meltzer, JudicialPassivity, supra note 18.
163 See id. at 349 & n.15, 391 & n.196, 396 & n.215, 403 & n.237.
164 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 574; see also Meltzer, JudicialPassivity, supra note
18, at 383-90 (noting that Congress lacks the time to address all of the manifold
problems calling for its attention).
165 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §1, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
166 See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
167 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). I put to one side the
enactment in 1801 by the lame duck Federalist Congress of a grant of federal question jurisdiction, seeAct of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801), which thejeffersonians promptly repealed the following year. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156
(1802).
168 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 579-88.
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institutions. The breadth of those responsibilities, when viewed
against the limited time and attention that legislators can devote to
any single one of the myriad of bills under consideration, seriously
tests any interpretive approach premised on the capacity of Congress to resolve up front all important questions relating to a statu69
tory scheme. 1
A second point concerns a cluster of institutional and political
factors that make the American legislative process less conducive to
the enactment of comprehensive statutes than is the case in many parliamentary systems. These factors include a lack of party discipline
and of executive control of the legislature that characterizes parliamentary systems. 170 Indeed, a certain measure of statutory generality,
and a failure to spell things out comprehensively, may be necessary in
order to obtain agreement within the House and Senate, and among
those two chambers and the President, especially in the frequent periods of divided government that were common in the last part of the
twentieth century.1 7 ' On a different dimension, federal lawmakers
are accustomed in our system to legislating against a background of
common law rules and state law,1 72 rather than seeking to formulate
statutory schemes that aspire to be a complete corpusjuris. Additionally, legislative drafting in the United States tends to be less professional and centralized than is true in many other countries. 73 "For all
of these reasons, federal legislation is likely to be partial, un-inte1 74
grated, reactive, and lacking in coherence."
Of course, the judicial-legislative relationship is dynamic,1 75 and
it is at least possible that if federal judges insisted on exercising jurisdiction in every case that fell within the scope of a textual grant, Congress would be more careful at the outset to spell out, more precisely,
169
170

Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 18, at 386.
See, e.g.,
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 4 (1999) (referring to

Great Britain).

171

See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE

REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:

NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235, 250 (Morris Dickstein ed.,

1998).

172

See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
435-36 (1953).

HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM

173 See James R. Maxeiner, High Time for American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or
Roscoe Pound's 1906 Address Revisited, 15 FORDRAM INT'L L.J. 1, 13 (1991) (observing
that "the general level of legislation is markedly higher in many European countries
than in the United States."); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 659 (1999) (discussing England).
174

Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 18, at 385.

175

See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 115, at 904-07.
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just when it does and does not want jurisdiction to be exercised.1 76
Possible, yes, but not likely. As Judge Posner has observed more
broadly about interpretive theories premised on their effects on legislative behavior:
There is no evidence that members of Congress, or their assistants
who do the actual drafting, know [any supposed interpretive code
that Congress uses when it writes statutes] or that if they know, they
pay attention to it.... We should demand evidence that statutory

draftsmen follow the code before we erect a method of7 7interpreting
statutes on the improbable assumption that they do.1
Many of the same observations apply to a different possible objection to Shapiro's argument-the objection that courts need not engage in the fine tuning that he advocates because Congress, if it is
unhappy with the results, can always fix them. Indeed, the very institutional factors that make it difficult in the first instance to enact legislation in the United States-bicameralism and the need for presidential
assent; the absence of strong party control; the scarcity of legislative
time; and the existence of the many veto gates through which a bill
must pass 1 78-equally frustrate the enactment of corrective legislation. Moreover, even in the unusual case in which Congress does respond to a judicial decision, all is not necessarily well, for the failure
of courts to have made the correct decision in the first instance cre179
ates obvious interim problems all too easy to downplay.
These observations obviously reach beyond a robust judicial role
in matters that are specifically jurisdictional. There may indeed be, as
he suggested, particular reasons for an especially robust role with respect to jurisdictional matters, because of the courts' special expertise,
because such matters "intimately affect the courts' relations with each
other as well as with the other branches of government,"'i 0 and because here, unlike some other areas, state law does not provide a useful resource in resolving specific issues that are not addressed by
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statutory text. 8 1 But I hope that the observations just offered are seen
as reinforcing the thrust of Shapiro's argument and indeed as sug82
gesting that its implications radiate more broadly.'
Having said this, let me close with an observation with which I
think Shapiro would agree. Judges obviously are not perfect. Individual judges inevitably will get things wrong (how much less fun to be a
law professor were that not so). And the judiciary as a whole may get
things wrong too. Indeed, I have already indicated (here taking a view
from which Shapiro might dissent) that courts may have erred in trying to fine tune the reach of § 1331. But we must remind ourselves
that if the choice is not one between judicial perfection and legislative
shortcoming, neither is it one between legislative perfection and judicial shortcoming. It is between imperfect alternatives, and I think
Shapiro's argument that a robust judicial role is to be preferred remains entirely convincing.
CONCLUSION

Nearly twenty years since its publication, Jurisdictionand Discretion
remains a probing and sophisticated treatment of a vital and complex
set of questions-questions at the intersection of federalism and separation of powers. The appropriate role of the federal courts in rounding out the contours of their subject matter jurisdiction-or, more
broadly, in rounding out the contours of federal legislative enactments-remains a matter of enormous importance in the American
legal system. No treatment of the problems that Shapiro addresses is,
in my judgment, as rich, nuanced, or persuasive. That some of the
current Justices have not fully accepted his message simply shows that
even the best of teachers face challenges in gaining acceptance for
their ideas, especially from self-confident and mature Supreme Court
Justices with broad experience and strong views. But the issues that
Shapiro discusses are enduring ones, and one who shares his faith in
the force of reason may fairly hope that, over the long haul, the evident power of his analysis and prescriptions will fully carry the day.

181 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 172, at 435-36 (discussing other
contexts in which state law appropriately fills in the gaps in federal legislation).
182 For an elaboration, see Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 18 passim.

